The NCLT, Bengaluru Bench, held that an IRP cannot claim fees during the period CIRP proceedings are stayed and that closure due to settlement is not a withdrawal under Section 12A of the IBC.

The NCLT, Mumbai Bench, ruled that once a resolution plan is CoC-approved and compliant under Section 30(2) IBC, the Adjudicating Authority cannot question the CoC’s commercial wisdom.

The NCLAT clarified that ESI contributions deducted from employees’ wages are trust property and cannot be included in the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(i) of the IBC.

NCLAT Chennai held that the concept of ‘symbolic possession’ has no legal standing under the IBC, and the Interim Resolution Professional must assume complete control of the Corporate Debtor’s assets once CIRP commences.

NCLAT ruled that email service and attempted physical delivery satisfy notice requirements under Rule 38 NCLT Rules, and upheld admission of a Section 7 IBC application once debt and default were established.

NCLAT held that a takeover agreement with share allotment and consistent asset treatment establishes ownership for the corporate debtor even without a registered sale deed, preventing the transferor from reclaiming possession during CIRP.

NCLAT held that directors who invested in illiquid, non-traded shares during imminent insolvency without due diligence were liable under Section 66(2) IBC and could be ordered to personally contribute to the liquidation estate.

NCLAT held that a Resolution Professional may terminate leave and licence agreements with one-month notice under Section 60(5) IBC and that the Adjudicating Authority may order eviction and recovery of dues despite objections under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.

NCLAT held that illegal possession of corporate debtor assets does not prevent initiation of CIRP, and a Financial Creditor’s Section 7 application remains maintainable despite partial payments or asset occupation by others.

NCLAT ruled that Section 9 IBC applications cannot be maintained for defaults during the Section 10A suspension period and that Adjudicating Authorities lack power to modify default dates without a formal amendment by the applicant.