The Supreme Court found that the defence raised by the appellant satisfies the standard of “preponderance of probability”.
The Supreme Court bench comprising Justices B.R. Gavai and M.M. Sundresh was hearing an appeal on Wednesday, where the bench was of the considered opinion that the defence raised by the appellant satisfied the standard of “preponderance of probability”.
In the present case, the learned Trial Court found that the Income Tax Returns of the complainant did not disclose that he lent the amount to the accused and that the declared income was not sufficient to give a loan of Rs.3 lakh. Therefore, the case of the complainant that he had given a loan to the accused from his agricultural income was found to be unbelievable by the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court found that it was highly doubtful as to whether the complainant had lent an amount of Rs.3 lakh to the accused. The learned Trial Court also found that the complainant had failed to produce the promissory note alleged to have been executed by the accused on 25th October 1998. After taking into consideration the defence witnesses and the attending circumstances, the learned Trial Court found that the defence was a possible defence and as such, the accused was entitled to benefit of the doubt. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of the preponderance of probabilities. Applying this principle, the learned Trial Court found that the accused had rebutted the presumption on the basis of the evidence of the defence witnesses and attending circumstances.
The Apex Court observed that the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal was limited. Unless the High Court found that the appreciation of the evidence is perverse, it could not have interfered with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court.
In the present case, the Supreme Court were of the considered opinion that the defence raised by the appellant satisfied the standard of “preponderance of probability”.
The Supreme Court bench observed that the High Court was not justified in reversing the order of acquittal of the appellant.
The Supreme Court noted that insofar as the Civil Appeals were concerned, the High Court, by two different judgments and orders, has reversed the judgments and orders of the learned Trial Court dismissing the suits, thereby decreeing them. It is a settled proposition of law that the standard of proof in criminal proceedings differs from that in civil proceedings.
A distinguishing fact between the criminal proceedings and the civil proceedings in the present case was that, while in the criminal proceedings, the complainant had failed to produce the promissory notes, in the civil proceedings, the complainant had proved the promissory notes.
Though it was sought to be argued before the High Court that in view of the judgment in the criminal proceedings, the suit(s) was also liable to be dismissed, the High Court rightly observed that the adjudication in civil matters is based on the preponderance of probabilities whereas adjudication in criminal cases is based on the principle that the accused is presumed to be innocent and the guilt of the accused should be proved to the hilt and the proof should be beyond all reasonable doubt.
The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the judgments and orders passed by the High Court in the Civil Appeals. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court modified the decree. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the appellants have deposited an amount of Rs.7 lakh and Rs. 2 lakh pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court dated 20th February, 2009 passed in Criminal Appeal and connected matter and dated 13th August, 2012 passed in Civil Appeal No.10501 of 2013. The said amount has been directed to be invested in Fixed Deposit Receipts from time to time.
Thus, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1978 of 2013 and 1990 of 2013 were allowed and the common judgment of conviction dated 28th October 2008 and order of sentence dated 30th October 2008 respectively were quashed and set aside. The judgments and orders dated 10th July 2011 passed by the learned Trial Court were confirmed. Civil Appeal Nos. 10500 of 2013 and 10501 of 2013 were dismissed. However, the decrees of the High Court were modified, thereby restricting them to the amount already deposited by the appellants in this Court in the civil and criminal proceedings, along with interest accrued thereon. The respondents in both the Civil Appeals would be entitled to withdraw 50% of the amount each from the amount deposited in this Court with interest accrued up to date.