The Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Sanjiv Khanna and J.K. Maheshwari was recently hearing an Appeal and held that the complainant failed to establish the conditions and incidence of the penal liability set out under Sections 405, 420, and 471 of the Indian Penal Code.
The appeal was filed against the order of the Allahabad High Court, whereby the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad has dismissed the Appellants' petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731, challenging the summoning order dated 19th July 2018 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 8, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh.
The Supreme Court bench found that the assertions made in the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence led by respondent no. 2 - complainant failed to establish the conditions and incidence of the penal liability set out under Sections 405, 420, and 471 of the IPC, as the allegations pertain to an alleged breach of contractual obligations.
Pertinently, the Apex Court, in a number of cases, has noticed attempts made by parties to invoke jurisdiction of criminal courts, by filing vexatious criminal complaints by camouflaging allegations which were ex facie outrageous or pure civil claims. The Supreme Court noted that these attempts were not entertained and should be dismissed at the threshold.
The Supreme Court cautioned, subordinate courts must cautiously examine the facts to ascertain whether they only constitute a civil wrong, as the ingredients of criminal wrong are missing. A conscious application of the said aspects is required by the Magistrate, as a summoning order has grave consequences of setting criminal proceedings in motion. Even though at the stage of issuing process to the accused the Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons, there should be adequate evidence on record to set the criminal proceedings into motion.
The requirement of Section 204 of the Code is that the Magistrate should carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record. He/she may even put questions to the complainant and his/her witnesses when examined under Section 200 of the Code to elicit answers to find out the truth about the allegations, the Supreme Court bench observed.
Supreme Court reiterated that only upon being satisfied that there is sufficient ground for summoning the accused to stand trial, a summons should be issued. A summoning order is to be passed when the complainant discloses the offence, and when there is material that supports and constitutes essential ingredients of the offence. It should not be passed lightly or as a matter of course. When the violation of law alleged is clearly debatable and doubtful, either on account of paucity and lack of clarity of facts or on the application of law to the facts, the Magistrate must ensure clarification of the ambiguities. Summoning without appreciating the legal provisions and their application to the facts may result in an innocent being summoned to stand the prosecution/trial. Initiation of prosecution and summoning of the accused to stand trial, apart from monetary loss, sacrifice of time, and effort to prepare a defence, also causes humiliation and disrepute in society.
The Apex Court noted that the High Court while dismissing the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code, failed to take due notice that criminal proceedings should not be allowed to be initiated when it is manifest that these proceedings have been initiated with the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance and with a view to spite the opposite side due to private or personal grudge.
Allegations in the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence on record, when taken at face value and accepted in entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged. The inherent powers of the court can and should be exercised in such circumstances. When the allegations in the complaint were so absurd or inherently improbable, on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient wrong for proceeding against the accused, summons should not be issued, the Supreme Court noted.
For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal was allowed.