In the present case, the High Court observed allegations against banks and financial institutions regarding the forceful seizure and repossession of vehicles. The High Court decided to leave the investigation of these allegations to the appropriate investigating agency, allowing them to look into the complaints and conduct an independent investigation.
The High Court focused on the plea made by the banks and financial institutions regarding their ability to seize and repossess vehicles without following the proper legal procedures outlined in the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the rules framed under it. The High Court concluded that the covenants in the loan agreements create a "security interest" in the vehicle in favour of the banks and financial institutions, but they must exercise their power to seize and repossess the vehicle in accordance with the provisions of the Act, rules, and RBI guidelines. The High Court noted that the banks and financial institutions cannot continue to seize and repossess vehicles in an illegal manner.
The High Court directed the Superintendent of Police of all districts in the State of Bihar to ensure that recovery agents of banks and financial institutions do not take the law into their own hands. They should not intercept vehicles and seize them without a court order. Any seizure or repossession of a defaulting vehicle should only be done in accordance with the law and the established legal procedure.
For cases where the vehicles have not been sold, the High Court ordered the petitioner(s) and the bank/financial institution to reconcile the loan account and determine the outstanding amount due. The bank/financial institution should not charge interest for the period during which the vehicle remained in seizure, and the Covid-19 lockdown period should be considered. The petitioner(s) should pay 30% of the outstanding amount and receive the release of the vehicle, with an undertaking to pay the remaining 70% with applicable interest in suitable instalments decided by the banks/financial institutions. The petitioner(s) should also continue to pay the current EMI, and failure to do so may result in the bank/financial institution proceeding to repossess the vehicle.
In cases where the vehicle has been sold to a third party and cannot be restored, the bank/financial institution is liable to pay the petitioner(s) the value of the vehicle as per its insurance value on the date of seizure. This amount should be adjusted against the outstanding vehicle loan, and any surplus should be made available to the petitioner(s). The petitioners have the option to challenge the accounts provided by the banks/financial institutions and claim compensation for the loss arising from the seizure of their vehicles in the appropriate court/forum.
Since the actions of the banks/financial institutions were deemed illegal, the High Court ordered the contesting respondents to pay Rs. 50,000/- (fifty thousand) as the cost of litigation to each of the respective writ petitioners within 30 days from the date of receipt/production of a copy of the judgment.
Finally, the High Court disposed of the writ applications and instructed the Director General of Police, Bihar, to issue necessary instructions to all the Senior Superintendents of Police/Superintendents of Police in the state to comply with the directions provided in the judgment.

The High Court found that the Trial Court had erred in dismissing the petitioner/Bank's application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure to reject the plaint. The High Court held that the claim of First Respondent had already been dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, and the present suit was barred by the principles of res judicata.
The High Court noted that the first respondent should have pursued other legal measures for recovery instead of involving themselves in the dispute between the husband and wife respondents and the petitioner bank. Therefore, the High Court set aside the Trial Court's order and directed it to reconsider the petitioner/Bank's application. The Civil Revision Petition was disposed of accordingly.

If the bank refuses to extend further the Bank Guarantees and Secured Overdraft Facilities, the borrower will have to clear their dues against these credit facilities. Any default on these dues is covered under Section 3(12) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

The present review petition seeks a recall or review of a judgment and order passed by the High Court on 30.09.2022. The petitioner had initially approached the High Court through a Special Leave Petition (Civil) and was granted permission to withdraw the petition with the liberty to file a review.
The main issue raised in the review application is whether the petitioner, as an auction purchaser, can be held liable for the electricity dues of the previous owner/occupier of the property. The High Court had previously held that the auction purchaser is liable for the outstanding electricity dues based on the provisions of Clause 4.3 of the U.P. Electricity Supply Code, 2005.
The review applicant argued that an error has been made in the interpretation of Clause 4.3 and that the provision does not impose liability on the auction purchaser for the outstanding dues. The applicant also relied on previous judgments and provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 to support their argument. The High Court examined the relevant provisions and auction notice and concluded that the auction purchaser had an obligation to inquire about any outstanding dues or encumbrances related to the property.
The High Court upheld the liability of the auction purchaser to pay outstanding electricity dues of the previous owner based on the specific provisions of the Electricity Supply Code and rejected the argument that such liability should not be imposed on the purchaser. The High Court also noted that the auction sale was conducted on an "as is where is" basis, absolving the Recovery Officer of liabilities. Based on these findings, the High Court upheld its previous judgment and dismisses the review application.

the present case, the borrower filed S.A. No. 253 of 2012 before the DRT, Hyderabad against the action taken by the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. The DRT, Hyderabad by order dated 19.12.2016 gave the liberty to the borrower to file the list of intending buyers of the property and to bring forth with the buyers so as to enable the Tribunal to consider the same for repayment of the dues of the Bank. That thereafter on 25.02.2016 the DRT passed the order that and the Bank was directed to go ahead with the sale as proposed excluding the Flat to be identified and communicated by the Applicant to the Respondent Bank by 29.02.2016 with full detailed of all the Purchasers to the Bank Officers on affidavit so as to enable the Bank Officer to exclude those Flats, provided the remaining Flats were sufficient for recovery of the dues.
At this stage it is required to be noted that the flat in question namely Flat No.6401 was not the seven flats identified by the borrower to be kept out of the auction proceedings. At the relevant time the flat in question was not sold amongst the seven flats mentioned before the Tribunal. That thereafter during the pendency of the S.A. No. 253 of 2012 and without obtaining prior approval and/or intimation to the DRT and even the bank, the borrower entered into the sale agreement with the respondent no. 1 on 16.06.2016. At this stage, and the MoU dated 10.04.2016 between the borrower and the respondent no. 1 in Clause No. 4, it was specifically provided that first the party should obtain clearance of sale from DRT/SBH so that they can process with further agreement to sale. Thus, as such respondent no. 1 at the relevant time was aware about the pending DRT proceedings. Still the respondent no. 1 entered into the agreement to sale with the borrower on 16.06.2016. It is pertinent to note that thereafter when the Bank issued a public notice on 28.07.2016 for auctioning the properties of the borrower. Before the date of auction, on 24.08.2016 the borrower filed an application before the DRT praying for stay of all proceedings of the Bank pursuant to the auction notice dated 28.07.2016. The DRT was pleased to reject the said application for stay vide the order dated 24.08.2016 by observing that the sale of the flat in question without the permission of the Bank or the Tribunal is void. Thus, as such the transaction in favour of the respondent no. 1 with respect to Flat no.6401 was already held to be void by the DRT. That thereafter, after the borrower having failed to obtain any order, the respondent no.1 had straightway filed the writ petition challenging the e-auction notice which the borrower failed to get any relief before the DRT. If the respondent no. 1 would have approached the DRT against the e-auction notice he would have been non-suited in view of the earlier order passed by the DRT dated 24.08.2016. Therefore, calculatively the respondent no. 1 filed the writ petition before the High Court challenging the e-auction notice and that too after conducting of the e-auction on 31.08.2016 and the sale in favour of the appellant was confirmed. The Supreme Court noted that the aforesaid facts were pointed out before the High Court and despite the same the High Court has allowed the writ petition which was not sustainable at all. By the impugned order the respondent no.1 has got the relief which as such the borrower failed to get from the DRT. On the aforesaid grounds the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court was unsustainable.
It is required to be noted that what was challenged before the High Court by respondent no. 1 in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was the e-auction notice which was pursuant to the action initiated by the Bank in exercise of powers under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. At this stage the e-auction was held/conducted on 31.08.2016 in which the appellant participated and was declared as a successful bidder and made a payment of 25% of the bid amount on the very day i.e., on 31.08.2016. However, thereafter the respondent no.1 filed the writ petition before the High Court challenging the e-auction notice dated 28.07.2016 on 14.09.2016 that was after conducting of the auction.
The Supreme Court noted that against any steps taken by the Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act the aggrieved party has a remedy under the SARFAESI Act by way of appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to approach the DRT. Therefore, in view of the availability of the alternative statutory remedy available by way of proceedings/appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in which the e-auction notice was under challenge. Therefore, the High Court has committed a very serious error in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the e-auction notice issued by the Bank in exercise of power under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.
In the present case, it is very debatable whether Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act shall be applicable in favour of a person who is only an agreement to sale holder or Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act shall be applicable only in case of the borrower who is ready and willing to pay the entire debt. The borrower did not apply and/or invoke Section 13(8) and did not agree to clear the entire dues. The borrower failed to get any relief from the DRT. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in allowing the writ petition.
In the present case, it is to be noted that as such what exact relief was granted by the High Court is not clear. The High Court has simply stated that the writ petition was allowed. However, what was challenged before the High Court was the e-auction notice dated 28.07.2016 which was already conducted on 31.08.2016. Therefore, the writ petition was filed much after conducting the e-auction on 31.08.2016. No consequential relief has been granted by the High Court. Therefore, also the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court was unsustainable.
Now so far as the submission on behalf of the respondent no.1 that the respondent no.1 has paid/deposited the amount of sale consideration and now the respondent no.1 has died his heirs will have to vacate the flat in question and on the other hand the appellant shall be entitled to return the amount of Rs. 6,45,250/- deposited at the relevant time being 25% of the auction sale consideration with interest is concerned, at the outset it is required to be noted that as such the transaction between the respondent no.1 and the borrower pursuant to the agreement to sale dated 16.06.2016 was absolutely illegal and behind the back of the DRT as well as the Bank and during the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal. In order dated 24.08.2016 the Tribunal had in fact already held the sale transaction as void. As observed hereinabove even at the time when the respondent no. 1 entered into the agreement to sale/MoU he was aware about the proceedings pending before the DRT which is apparent from Clause 4 of the MoU referred to hereinabove. Therefore, respondent no. 1 and/or his heirs cannot be permitted to get the benefit of his own wrong and cannot be permitted to get the benefit of a void transaction.
The supreme Court quashed and set aside the order passed by the High Court and directed that on the full payment of the auction sale consideration by the appellant (after deducting the 25% of the amount already deposited earlier) with 9% interest from the date of auction till the actual amount is paid, to be paid within a period of four weeks, the sale certificate be issued in favour of the appellant with respect to Flat No. 6401. Whatever the amount was already deposited by the respondent no. 1/his heirs shall be returned to the respondent no. 1 (now his heirs) with the interest at 9% from the date of such deposit till the actual date of return which shall be returned within a period of four weeks from today. The heirs of original respondent no. 1 were granted three months’ time to vacate the flat in question and are directed to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the Flat No. 6401 to the appellant within a period of three months from today as ordered above.
Present appeals were allowed.

Section 19(1) of The Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 states that a bank or financial institution can make an application to the Tribunal for debt recovery within the jurisdiction where the branch or office is maintaining the outstanding debt account, where the defendant resides or carries on business, or where the cause of action arises. The bank can withdraw the application with the permission of the Debts Recovery Tribunal to take action under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002. Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 exempts agricultural land from the provisions of the Act. The DRAT observed that the nature of the land on which the OTS (One Time Settlement) depends should be adjudicated by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The application filed by the respondent in the O.A. proceeding was considered not maintainable, and the Special Officer's report should have been confirmed after addressing objections. The issue of whether the respondents are willful defaulters was not addressed by the learned DRT.
The DRAT noted that the order under challenge was passed without jurisdiction. The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal set aside the order of the DRT and suggested that the respondents may file an application in compliance with the Calcutta High Court's order in the pending S.A. proceeding.

The instant appeal was filed against the dismissal of SARFAESI Applications No. 98 of 2011, 151 of 2011, and 179 of 2011 by the Learned DRT, Vishakhapatnam. The appeal specifically challenges the dismissal of SARFAESI Application No. 179 of 2011.
The appellant runs an English Medium High School in Nellore and had availed loan facilities from the respondent bank, providing the school building and premises as collateral security. The bank classified the loan account as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) and issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act 2002, demanding a sum of Rs. 56,53,861.00. Several notices and auction proceedings followed, with various alleged violations of the SARFAESI Act and Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.
The SARFAESI Application was ultimately dismissed by the Learned DRT on July 5, 2012. The appellant challenges this dismissal on various grounds, including violations of the rules, under-valuation of the secured assets, and alleged wrong classification of the account as NPA.
The respondent bank argued that the SARFAESI Application became infructuous as no auction was conducted based on the notice dated September 8, 2011. They also claimed that the account was rightly classified as NPA and that the necessary notices and auction proceedings were conducted according to the law.
The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) noted that the appellant has chosen to challenge the judgment passed in SARFAESI Application No. 179 of 2011, while the findings of the DRT regarding SARFAESI Application No. 98 of 2011 and 151 of 2011 are not under challenge and have attained finality.
After considering the arguments and examining the evidence, the DRAT observed that the there was no violation of the rules and procedures governing the auction and valuation of the secured assets, and the property was sold at a reasonable value after multiple attempts.
The DRAT upheld the order of the DRT.

In the present case, a writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging an order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The petitioner had previously filed cases before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) regarding the order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, and an e-auction sale notice. The Chief Judicial Magistrate entertained another application by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the Act in relation to the petitioner's dwelling unit and granted it without following the provisions of the Act. The High Court held that if the petitioner is aggrieved by the Section 14 proceedings, they should seek remedy through the Debts Recovery Tribunal and cannot directly approach the High Court. The petitioner was granted liberty to approach the DRT within ten days. Status quo was ordered to be maintained during this period. The writ petition was disposed of.

The Supreme Court Judgment discussed several issues related to the finality of court decisions, the power of the court to review its own orders, and the validity of a specific provision in the Haryana General Sales Tax Act. The Supreme Court referred to a previous decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, which states that a decision made by a competent court should be considered final, subject to review by a higher court for correcting a patent error. The Supreme Court asserted its inherent power to rectify mistakes if it finds that an order was wrongly passed and a mistake was committed. It observed that an act of the court should not harm any party involved and that acknowledging a mistake does not undermine the court's authority.
In the specific case at hand, the Supreme Court observed that reopening a final issue is not usual but justifiable due to a gross error that needs correction. It stated that a state law, which was within the competence of the state legislature, was wrongly outlawed by the High Court in a writ petition that became infructuous due to subsequent developments. The Apex Court highlighted that the High Court was not aware of these developments and thus erred in its judgment.
The Supreme Court also noted to an affidavit filed by the Punjab National Bank (PNB) during the proceedings. It stated that PNB had accepted a compromise proposal from the borrower during the pendency of the writ petition, resulting in full settlement of the loan liability and the release of the mortgaged property. The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's judgment, which invalidated section 16-B of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, was unnecessary and incorrect. It cited a previous decision (Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala) to support its conclusion that the provisions of the Debts Recovery Tribunal Act and the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act do not grant priority to secured creditors over the dues of the state.
Based on the above reasoning, the Supreme Court held that section 16-B of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act is valid and not ultra vires the Constitution or the Banking Companies Act. It noted that the observation made in the High Court's decision regarding the validity of section 16-B in relation to section 35 of the SARFAESI Act has no effect.
The Supreme Court further noted that it will not delve into the question of whether the state has the first charge over the property in question, as the matter has been dismissed regarding PNB, and reopening the proceedings against PNB after a significant amount of time has lapsed would not be appropriate.
Overall, the Supreme Court judgment concluded that the High Court made errors in its judgment and that section 16-B of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act is valid.

In the present case, the writ petition was filed to challenge the order issued by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate of Egmore, Chennai. The order in question was passed by the learned magistrate in response to Crl. M.P. No. 3124 of 2019, filed by the first respondent/secured creditor under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The High Court observed that the writ petition should be dismissed outright since the petitioners did not challenge the order passed under Section 14 of the Act by filing an appeal under Section 17 of the same Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The High Court noted that when there is an alternative statutory remedy available, such as filing an appeal, approaching the High Court through a writ petition is not maintainable.