REED

CaseLaws

Filter by Applicable Statute and Provision Number
Search by Party's Name
arrow&v
arrow&v
OR
Additional Filters
arrow&v
arrow&v
Search
arrow&v
arrow&v
arrow&v
New Search

M.P. Ramani v. State of Kerala and Another

Citation

Date

Brief

REED 2022 SC 08009

Court

Supreme Court

Subject 

Cheque – Forged Signature – Bank Account No. standing in the name of the appellant had been fraudulently obtained by the respondent No.2 - on forging the appellant’s signature attempted to extract amount from her account - Appellant herein who was arrayed as Respondent No.2 in Crl.M.C. before the High Court of Kerala was in the Appeal assailing the order - Whereas the High Court allowed the petition filed by Respondent No.2 herein under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and quashed the final report submitted alleging commission of offence under Sections 420, 465, 468 and 472 IPC by respondent No.2 herein

August 10, 2022

Bench

N.A.

Applicable Law

Sections 173, 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Sections 420, 465, 468, 472, Indian Penal Code, 1860

The Appellant herein who was arrayed as Respondent No.2 in Crl.M.C. before the High Court of Kerala was in this appeal assailing the order. By the said order, the High Court allowed the petition filed by Respondent No.2 herein under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and quashed the final report submitted alleging commission of offence under Sections 420, 465, 468 and 472 IPC by respondent No.2 herein.
The brief facts leading to the case was that the appellant herein as de facto complainant filed a complaint dated before the Sub-Inspector, Payyannur Police Station alleging that the cheque bearing No.813/063676 of Canara Bank, Payyannur Branch relating to A/c No.13111/2019 standing in the name of the appellant had been fraudulently obtained by the respondent No.2 herein and on forging the appellant’s signature had attempted to extract amount from her account.
It was specifically alleged that the signature on the cheque was forged and the cheque was drawn for a sum of Rs.3,50,000/- and was presented through the Federal Bank, Payyannur Branch through the account maintained by respondent No.2. The complaint further alleged that the cheque was allotted to the appellant by the Canara Bank, 30 years back and was not in use for want of new MCRI number. Based on the said complaint, FIR No.66 dated 20.01.2014 came to be registered for offence under Sections 420, 465, 468 and 472 IPC. Pursuant thereto the investigation was conducted and the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was filed before the Competent Court. The respondent No.2 herein was accordingly accused of having committed the crime alleged by the appellant.
The appellant, at that stage filed the petition under Section 482 before the High Court seeking that the final report be quashed. The appellant was arrayed as respondent No.2 to the said petition. The High Court by the impugned order dated 07.10.2020 allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings. The appellant, thus being aggrieved was before the Supreme Court assailing the said order.
Though detailed investigation was conducted and the final report was filed. The Supreme Court noted that the order of the High Court was not only brief, but cryptic, while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, neither adverted to the facts arising in the case in detail nor to the nature of the allegation which led to the investigation and the filing of the final report. The only observation which appeared to have influenced the decision of the High Court was that the cheque leaf belonged to the appellant and it contained her signature and there was no allegation of threat. On the other hand, the very case sought to be made out by the appellant was that the cheque belonging to the appellant had been wrongly possessed by respondent No.2 and the cheque had been presented for realization by forging her signature and an attempt was made to extract the money. The non-examination of the case was incorrect perspective, keeping in view the guideline laid down by the Supreme Court to be borne in mind while exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., in various decisions, had led to an order which on the face of it was not sustainable.
Having noted that the High Court had quashed the final report without adverting to either the facts or law by a cryptic order, the Supreme Court set aside the order and restored the petition to the file to the High Court so as to enable the parties to put forth their contentions and allowed the High Court to comprehensively advert to the matter on facts and law.
The Appeal was allowed.

State Bank of India v. V.K. Bakshi

Citation

Date

Brief

REED 2022 Del 08004

Court

High Court

Subject 

Bank Service – Removal from Service – Appeal - Question for consideration of in intra-court appeal - Whether the Labour Court could reduce the penalty from “removal from service” to “stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect” - in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

August 7, 2022

Bench

Delhi

Applicable Law

Sections 10, 11A, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

The High Court perused the Award of the Labour Court in the light of the legal principles as enunciated and explained in the legal decisions. It has examined each charge against the respondent/workman and sifted through the evidence on record. It has been noted that the allegations against the respondent/workman essentially pertain to raising of loans without seeking prior approval of the competent authority, which fact was also candidly admitted by the respondent/workman in his reply to the charge sheet. The Labour Court also noted the justification given by the respondent/workman that the loans were raised by him on account of illness of his daughter, purchase of a house and establishment of business of his son. With regard to the allegation of respondent’s outstanding amount towards one M/s Evergreen Chit Fund Pvt. Ltd., the Award has concluded that the respondent had not borrowed any loan from the said company. In fact, the brother of the respondent took a loan for which the respondent stood as guarantor but due to the untimely death of the said brother, the borrowed amount could not be returned by the borrower. Nevertheless, in time-through installments the due amount stood paid by the respondent/workman. Having regard to the evidence on record, the Labour Court concluded that the respondent/ workman had not been found guilty of any charge involving moral turpitude and that the overdue loan amounts stood repaid. Premised on the above factors, it concluded that punishment of “removal from service” was very grave and severe in nature and was liable to be reduced to “Stoppage of three increments with cumulative effect”.
Evidently before altering the punishment, the Labour Court had recorded its satisfaction that the punishment imposed upon the workman was disproportionate to the degree of guilt or wrongdoing of the respondent/ workman. Such satisfaction was supported by reasons which were based upon the material on record. The Labour Court had not committed any error of law. It has exercised its discretion judicially within the parameters of law. Reduction in punishment as ordered by the Labour Court, therefore, needed no interference.
The Appeal was dismissed.

Sardar Paramjit Singh Girgla v. Punjab & Sind Bank

Citation

Date

Brief

REED 2022 Del 08005

Court

High Court

Subject 

Bank Service - Voluntarily retiring the Petitioner from the services - Bipartite Settlement - Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the award passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court- whereby the PO upheld the decision of the Respondent for not allowing the Petitioner to join his duties

August 3, 2022

Bench

Delhi

Applicable Law

Articles 226, 311, Constitution of India

In the present case, the Petitioner was appointed as apprentice at Punjab & Sind Bank, Janak Puri Branch, New Delhi vide letter No. Staff CA/1917 dated 23.05.1978 issued by Manager Personnel, Punjab and Sind Bank Ltd. (Regd Office, Hall Bazar, Amritsar). Later, the Petitioner was transferred to Hemkunt Colony, New Delhi. In view of the Petitioner’s unauthorized absence from duty, a notice dated 06.07.1996 was issued to him by the Bank directing him to report on duty within 30 days of the receipt of the said notice or provide an explanation of his absence otherwise he will be deemed to have been voluntarily retired from the services of the Respondent Bank on the expiry of the period of the said notice. The said notice was issued to the Petitioner on 06.07.1996 but was posted on 09.07.1996. Therefore, it was apparent that the said notice would have been received by the Petitioner on or after 09.07.1996. On 07.08.1996, i.e. within the period of 30 days, the Petitioner approached the Respondent Bank with an application seeking to join back his duties but he was not permitted to do so.
Thereafter, the Petitioner, vide letter dated 09.08.1996, again sought permission to join his duties and submitted that he could not report on duty earlier due to viral fever and back pain and was under treatment till 05.08.1996. The Respondent Bank, vide letter dated 14.08.1996, replied to the Petitioner to submitted proof of his illness from 17.06.1994 to 05.08.1996 for considering his request for allowing him to join his duties. The Petitioner sent a legal notice dated 27.08.1996 for withdrawing the notice dated 06.07.1996 issued by the Respondent Bank and to reinstate the Petitioner back in service from the day of his termination with full-service benefits. On 12.09.1996, the Petitioner filed a Suit No.544/1996 before the Civil Court and the same was dismissed by trial court vide its judgment dated 28.01.1998 on the ground of not being maintainable and premature. Another notice was issued to the Petitioner by the Respondent Bank on 07.10.1996 directing him to explain his unauthorized absence within 30 days of receipt of the notice, otherwise, he will be deemed to have been voluntarily retired from the services of the Bank on the expiry of the period of the said notice. In the absence of any response from the Petitioner to the Notice dated 07.10.1996 issued by the Respondent Bank, the Petitioner stood voluntarily retired with effect from 26.11.1996. The Petitioner has raised an Industrial Dispute thereby challenging his voluntarily retirement order.
The Industrial Tribunal at the first instance passed an award dated 01.05.2008 observing that the action of the Respondent for not allowing Petitioner to join his duty when he reported on duty on 07.08.1996, treating him as voluntarily retired from the services w.e.f. 26.11.1996 under Clause 17 of the BPS and detaining his salary dues, was neither proper nor justified. The learned Industrial Tribunal had accordingly directed that the management should reinstate the Petitioner with continuity in service but without back wages within two months from the date of the publication of the said award.
Subsequently, the respondent management filed an application before the learned Tribunal for setting aside the award dated 01.05.2008 claiming that they have not been given an opportunity to adduce additional evidence. The Tribunal set aside the said original award dated 01.05.2008 and permitted the respondent management to adduce additional evidence.
Thereafter, additional evidence was adduced by the management and after conclusion of the trial, the Industrial Tribunal passed the impugned award dated 23.07.2008, which was under challenge by way of the present writ petition.
The main thrust of the impugned award passed by the Industrial Tribunal is Clause 17 of the BPS. In order to ascertain the fact whether the Petitioner has been absenting himself unauthorizedly, it was relevant to look through the evidence produced by the parties.
From the conjoint reading of the different testimonies, it can be deciphered that the first notice dated 06.07.1996 was dispatched and received on 09.07.1996 pursuant to which the Petitioner reported for duty on 07.08.1996 and submitted an application stating the reason for his absence, however, it was stated that he was not allowed to join his duties as the Petitioner reported for duties after expiry of stipulated period of 30 days. It has also emerged from the testimonies of abovementioned witnesses that since no medical proof was attached with the application dated 07.08.1996, he was once again called upon vide letter dated 14.08.1996 to give sufficient proof of him being under medical treatment. However, admittedly, the letter dated 14.08.1996 was never served on the Petitioner and was received back unclaimed.
The evidence further reflects that no attendance register was produced by the Management/ Respondent. The details showing the period of days attended by the Petitioner from 17.06.1994 to 26.11.1996 have been produced by the Respondent/ Management vide Ex-MW1/1. It was also an admitted position that no departmental enquiry was held against the Petitioner for his unauthorized absence from duty and the action of deemed voluntarily retirement w.e.f. 26.11.1996 has been taken strictly in accordance with Clause 17 of BPS.
The Respondent/ Management claimed before the Industrial Tribunal that the Petitioner has attended the office for only 56 days during the period from 17.06.1994 to 26.11.1996. However, on a plain reading of the attendance chart which is, Ex. MW1/1, it transpires that the days which were national/ public holiday(s) are also included in the attendance chart, creating doubt on the authenticity and veracity of the said exhibited document. Moreover, the Respondent/Management failed to produce the attendance register or the medical leave register before the Industrial Tribunal.
Admittedly, the first notice dated 06.07.1996 was dispatched on 09.07.1996 and the Petitioner reported for duty on 07.08.1996. As per the BPS, the Petitioner was bound to report for duty within 30 days of the receipt of the notice. As such the period of the first notice is deemed to be reckoned from the date of receipt i.e., 09.07.1996. Taking into account 09.07.1996 as the date of receipt of the first notice, 30 days period to report for duty would come to an end on 08.08.1996 i.e., one day after the Petitioner reported for duty i.e., on 07.08.1996. As such it can be safely inferred that the Petitioner, pursuant to the first notice dated 06.07.1996 which was dispatched and received on 09.07.1996, reported for duty on 07.08.1996, i.e., within the stipulated period of 30 days and has adhered to the condition of reporting for duty within the specified period.
Clause 17 of the BPS is a continuous action by the Management, having different stages, for taking an action against an employee for unauthorized absence. When an employee abstains from his work for a period of more than 90 days, first notice is to be issued to such employee with a direction to report for duty within 30 days of the receipt of the notice (Stage-I). Pursuant thereto if an employee does not join his duties within the stipulated period of time he shall be deemed to have voluntarily retired unless he reports on duty without prejudice to the right of the Management to take action against the said employee in terms of law or rules of service (Stage-II).
The action in terms of BPS automatically comes to an end, if the delinquent employee report for duty within the stipulated period of 30 days from the date of receipt the of first notice, which in the present case, commences from 09.07.1996 and comes to an end on 08.08.1996 and the Petitioner reported on duty on 07.08.1996 i.e., within the stipulated period of 30 days. The occasion to issue the second notice will arise only if an employee, after reporting for duty in response to the first notice, again absents himself within a period of 30 days without submitting any application, which is not the case in the present matter.
It has been clearly mentioned in the BPS that despite reporting for duty within the stipulated period provided in the first notice, the Management is well within its rights to take any action against the employee in accordance with law or rules of service, if the Management is not satisfied with the justification/ explanation rendered by the employee after reporting for duty. In the present case, the action of deemed voluntary retirement of the Petitioner has been taken by the Management/ Respondent in terms of BPS after issuance of the second notice. In my opinion, the stage of issuance of the second notice does not arise as the Petitioner has joined his duties within the time period of 30 days as stipulated under the first notice and action, if any, so warranted, could have been taken pursuant to the joining of the Petitioner w.e.f. 07.08.1996 in accordance with law or rules of service. The action of Respondent/Management in not allowing the Petitioner to join his duties despite reporting within the prescribed period of 30 days from the date of issuance of the first notice is per se illegal, arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice. The learned Trial Court erred in holding that the deemed voluntarily retirement of the Petitioner w.e.f. 26.11.1996 without considering the fact that the Petitioner joined his duties within the prescribed time stipulated in terms of the first notice and therefore, the second notice could not have been issued in continuation of the first notice in terms of Clause 17 of the BPS.
In view of the aforementioned discussion and settled position of law applied to the facts of the present case, the Award dated 23.07.2008 passed by the Industrial Tribunal and the deemed voluntary retirement of the petitioner was set aside. The Respondent/ Management was directed to reinstate the Petitioner forthwith without back wages. The Petitioner was deemed to be in continuous service on notional basis.
The Petition was Allowed.

Sunil Kumar v. Delhi State Cooperative Bank Limited and Another

Citation

Date

Brief

REED 2022 Del 08006

Court

High Court

Subject 

Bank Service – Suspension of Bank employee – Allegation of misconduct and misappropriation – LPA filed by the Bank employee - against the order passed by the Single Judge of this Court

August 2, 2022

Bench

Delhi

Applicable Law

The facts of the case revealed that the Appellant herein was an employee of Delhi State Co-operative Bank Limited, serving on the post of Banking Assistant. It was stated that the Appellant was placed under suspension on 17.10.2011 on account of alleged misconduct and misappropriation. It was stated that a show cause notice was issued to the Appellant on 10.07.2012, following which a detailed enquiry took place in the matter. It was stated that upon completion of the enquiry, the Appellant was dismissed from service on 19.07.2013. It was further stated that thereafter the Appellant preferred an appeal before the Chairman of the Delhi State Cooperation Bank and on 17.09.2013 and a representation was submitted by the Appellant to the Lt. Governor of Delhi on 20.05.2015. It was also stated that pending the outcome of the Appeal before the Chairman of the Bank, the Appellant approached the High Court by filing a Writ Petition in the year 2021. It was stated that the Single Judge dismissed the said Writ Petition vide Order dated 28.10.2021 on account of delay and laches. The Appellant has, thereafter, filed the instant LPA.
Counsel appearing for the Appellant argued that the right of the Appellant to file an appeal could not have been taken away and in all fairness, the Single Judge should have directed the Bank to decide the appeal filed by the Appellant herein.
It is true that no hard and fast rule can be attributed as to when the Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in respect of a party who appears before it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. The judgment in Tukaram Kana Joshi was delivered in an altogether different context, that was, a matter relating to Land Acquisition Act, wherein, admittedly, the land of poor agriculturists was acquired by the State Government and not a single penny was paid for the said acquisition. Keeping this in view, the Supreme Court held that such people cannot be thrown out only on the ground of delay and laches.
In the present case, the Appellant was a person who was well educated and who was aware about his dismissal Order which was passed in the year 2013, yet he did not prefer a proper appeal to the appropriate authority as per the Delhi State Cooperative Bank Limited Service Rules, and woke up from slumber only in the year 2021 when an FIR was lodged against him in lieu of the alleged fraud and misappropriation.
The High Court was, therefore, of the opinion that the Single Judge was justified in dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the Appellant herein. The High Court, therefore, did not find any reason to interfere with the Order passed by the Single Judge.
The LPA was dismissed.

Central Bank of India and Others v. Dragendra Singh Jadon

Citation

Date

Brief

REED 2022 SC 08003

Court

Supreme Court

Subject 

Bank Service – Termination from service – Principle of res judicata - Appeal filed by the Bank - against the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing Writ Appeal filed by the Appellants against the order, passed by the Single Bench, allowing the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being Writ Petition filed by the Respondent

August 1, 2022

Bench

N.A.

Applicable Law

Articles 226, 227, Constitution of India

The supreme Court observed that the Single Bench of the High Court rightly granted relief to the Respondent. By the impugned judgment and order, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Appeal of the Appellants and directed that the Respondent would have to be treated in service from the date of removal till the date of actual reinstatement in service and would accordingly, be entitled to seniority and the right to be considered for promotion, but would not be entitled to back wages.
The Bench found no infirmity with the concurrent findings of the Single Bench and the Division Bench of the High Court. There is a difference between reappointment and reinstatement. Reinstatement means to return a person or thing to its previous position or status. An order of reinstatement puts a person back to the same position.
The Tribunal had granted the Respondent, the relief of reinstatement. Considering that the Respondent had not actually rendered service to the Appellant-Bank and that he had been earning in the intervening period, the Tribunal denied him back wages. The Tribunal and the High Court (both the Single Bench and the Division Bench) have in effect and substance found the termination of service of the Respondent to be wrongful.
The Appellant-Bank cannot take advantage of its own wrong of wrongfully dismissing the Respondent from service, to deny him the benefit of seniority, promotion and other benefits to which he would have been entitled, if he had attended to his duties. The appeal was, accordingly, dismissed.

Noor Mohammed v. Khurram Pasha

Citation

Date

Brief

REED 2022 SC 08002

Court

Supreme Court

Subject 

Dishonour of Cheque - Appeal – Appellant challenged the correctness of the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Revision Petition - Instant proceedings arisen out of Complaint Case instituted by the Respondent herein in respect of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

August 1, 2022

Bench

N.A.

Applicable Law

Sections 357, 421, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Sections 138, 143A, 143A(1), 143A(2), 143A(3), 143A(4), 143A(5), 145(2), Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

After empowering the Court to pass an order directing the accused to pay interim compensation under Sub-Section 1 of Section 143A, Sub-Section 2 then mandates that such interim compensation should not exceed 20 per cent of the amount of the cheque. The period within which the interim compensation must be paid is stipulated in Sub-Section 3, while Sub-Section 4 deals with situations where the drawer of the cheque is acquitted. Said Sub-Section 4 contemplates repayment of interim compensation along with interest as stipulated. Sub-Section 5 of said Section 143A then states “the interim compensation payable under this Section can be recovered as if it were a fine”. The expression interim compensation is one which is “payable under this Section” and would thus take within its sweep the interim compensation directed to be paid under Sub-Section 1 of said Section 143A.
The remedy for failure to pay interim compensation as directed by the Court is thus provided for by the Legislature. The method and modality of recovery of interim compensation is clearly delineated by the Legislature. It is well known principle that if a statute prescribes a method or modality for exercise of power, by necessary implication, the other methods of performance are not acceptable.
The concerned provision nowhere contemplates that an accused who had failed to deposit interim compensation could be fastened with any other disability including denial of right to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the complainant. Any such order foreclosing the right would not be within the powers conferred upon the Court and would, as a matter of fact, go well beyond the permissible exercise of power.
Since the right to cross-examine, the respondent was denied to the Appellant, the decisions rendered by the Courts below suffer from an inherent infirmity and illegality. Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed this appeal and setting aside the decisions of all three courts with further direction that Complaint Case No. 244 of 2019 shall stand restored to the file of the Trial Court. The Trial Court was directed to permit the Appellant to cross-examine the Respondent and then take the proceedings to a logical conclusion.

Sunita Palita & Others v. Panchami Stone Quarry

Citation

Date

Brief

REED 2022 SC 08001

Court

Supreme Court

Subject 

Dishonour of Cheque - Appeal - Filed against the order passed by the Calcutta High Court - dismissing the Criminal Revisional Application filed by the Appellants being the 3rd, 4th and 5th Accused, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - for quashing the proceedings under Section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - pending against the Appellants in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate

July 31, 2022

Bench

N.A.

Applicable Law

Sections 205, 305, 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Sections 2(47), 149, 150, Companies Act, 2013
Section 7, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
Sections 138, 141, 141(2), Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. protects the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise secure the ends of justice. While it is true that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specially laid down in the Section, the Court is duty bound to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. when the exercise of such power is justified by the tests laid down in the said Section. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. must be exercised if the interest of justice so requires.
There can be no doubt that in deciding a Criminal Revisional Application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing a proceeding under Section 138/141 of the NI Act, the laudable object of preventing bouncing of cheques and sustaining the credibility of commercial transactions resulting in enactment of the said Sections has to be borne in mind. The provisions of Section 138/141 of the NI Act create a statutory presumption of dishonesty on the part of the signatory of the cheque, and when the cheque is issued on behalf of a company, also those persons in charge of or responsible for the company or the business of the company. Every person connected with the company does not fall within the ambit of Section 141 of the NI Act.
The High Court rightly held that when a complaint was filed against the Director of a company, a specific averment that such person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company was an essential requirement of Section 141 of the NI Act. The High Court also rightly held that merely being a Director of the company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the NI Act. The requirement of Section 141 of the NI Act was that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. This has to be averred as a fact.
The High Court also rightly held that the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director would admittedly be in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business by virtue of the office they hold as Managing Director or Joint Manging Director. These persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company and they get covered under Section 141 of the NI Act. A signatory of a cheque is clearly liable under Section 138/141 of the NI Act.
The Supreme Court bench observed that the High Court, however, failed to appreciate that none of these Appellants were Managing Director or Joint Managing Director of the Accused Company, nor they were signatories of the cheque which was dishonoured.
A Director of a company who was not in charge or responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, will not be liable under those provisions. The liability under Section 138/141 of the NI Act arises from being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed, and not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company. It would be a travesty of justice to drag Directors, who may not even be connected with the issuance of a cheque or dishonour thereof. The materials on record clearly show that these Appellants were independent, non-executive Directors of the company. A non-Executive Director is not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company or in the running of its business. Such Director is in no way responsible for the day-to-day running of the Accused Company.
The Supreme Court was of the considered view, that the High Court erred in law in not exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C in the facts and circumstances of this case to grant relief to the Appellants.
For the reasons discussed above, the appeal was allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court was set aside.

Topline Shoes Limited and Another v. Punjab National Bank

Citation

Date

Brief

REED 2022 SC 07001

Court

Supreme Court

Subject 

Claims and charges – Respondent Bank filed an O.A. in DRT against the present Appellant raising certain claims - Appellants filed a counterclaim claiming therein that certain amount deposited in the current account opened by them with the respondent-Bank was illegally withheld by the respondent Bank – Respondent Bank had extracted the amount from them by exerting undue influence - Question of law arisen as to whether Article 22 or 113 of Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable for consideration

July 19, 2022

Bench

N.A.

Applicable Law

Articles 22, 113, Limitation Act, 1963

It could clearly be seen that in the factual position as apparent in the present matter, the specific case of the defendants-appellants was that the respondent-Bank had extracted the amount from them by exerting undue influence. It could further be seen that the Board of Directors of the Appellant had contemplated and considered the possibility of approaching the Court against the respondent– Bank. However, it was thought fit not to drag the respondent-Bank to the Court to avoid adverse publicity and mar their chances of receiving loans from other banks. It could thus be seen that the DRT has come to a finding of fact that it was the conscious decision of the appellants to pay off whatever amount was demanded by the respondent–Bank without joining the issue and they had accordingly paid the amount, may be much against their wishes.
Admittedly, the said amount, which according to the appellants, was paid under undue influence in the year 1994. It appears that after waiting for a period of five years, the appellants woke up from their deep slumber and issued a notice on 22nd September 1999.
The DRT, the DRAT as well as the High Court have concurrently held that the counterclaim of the appellants was based upon the amount deposited in the year 1994, which according to the appellants was paid under undue influence. If that be so, no error could be noticed in the finding of the fact as recorded by the DRT, the DRAT and the High Court that the counterclaim was squarely covered under Article 113 and not under Article 22 of the Limitation. The supreme Court found no merit in the appeal. The appeal was dismissed.

All India Union Bank Officer Staff Association and Others v. Government of India and Another

Citation

Date

Brief

REED 2022 Mad 04004

Court

High Court

Subject 

Bank Service - Scheme of Amalgamation - Writ Petition filed - For a Declaration - declaring that the Specialist Officer (Law) in Scale IV who have been transferred from Andhra Bank and Corporation Bank pursuant to the Scheme of Amalgamation dated 1.04.2020 to be placed in the seniority list of Chief Manager (Law) published on 7.12.2020 at the appropriate place based on the date of promotion and to consider and promote eligible officers to the post of Assistant General Manager (Law) in Scale V cadre pursuant to the promotion circular dated 1.12.2020 and to extend all service benefits which has been given to the Specialist Officers (Law) in the second respondent Bank

April 28, 2022

Bench

Madras

Applicable Law

Section 45, Banking Regulation Act,1949
Articles 14, 16, 226, Constitution of India
Clause 13, Scheme of Amalgamation
Clauses 1.12, 3.4, Staff Circular No. 7296 dated 1.12.2020

Relevant Clauses of the Circular No.7296 on Promotion Policy makes it clear that Law Officers of the Transferor Banks, who were already Generalist Officers in Scale IV, prior to the Scheme, cannot be considered as Specialist Officers after the Scheme. The petitioners, who were Generalist Officers working in the specialist segment cannot automatically claim that they should be treated as Specialist Officers and any such conversion would be subject to the promotion policy of the Union Bank of India.
Admittedly, in the case on hand, the petitioner had not challenged the validity of the Scheme. Unless the validity of the amalgamation scheme was challenged on the ground of arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity, mala fide or unconstitutional, the Apex Court cannot come to the aid of the petitioners.
The Supreme Court, on a careful consideration of the aforesaid promotional policy of the Transferor Banks as well as the Transferee Bank, Scheme of Amalgamation, was of the considered view that the seniority list of the second respondent bank dated 7.12.2020, published in pursuant to the Scheme of Amalgamation dated 1.04.2020, does not suffer from any mala fide or arbitrariness and therefore did not warrant interference. The petitioner Association had also not challenged the Scheme of Amalgamation dated 1.04.2020 and having accepted the same and participated in the selection process, the petitioners cannot turn around and claim that their seniority had been wrongly placed in the Transferee Bank.
It was to be noted that in pursuant to the interim order passed by the Supreme Court, the petitioners 2 and 3 had participated in the written examination for promotion under the Specialist category, but the results of the same have not been published.
In the light of the discussions and the reasons assigned, the Supreme Court noted that the second respondent bank shall publish the written examination results of the petitioners 2 and 3, who appeared under the Specialist Category for the year 2021-2022 and the petitioners 2 and 3 were at liberty to invoke Clause 3.4 of the Promotion Policy (Staff Circular No.7296 dated 1.12.2020] of the second respondent Bank by submitting a request for conversion to Specialized Segment, if they were otherwise qualified and eligible in the promotion process for Specialist Officer. On such request being made, it was for the second respondent Bank Management to consider the said request for conversion, considering the aforesaid facts. The Writ Petition was disposed of with the above liberty.

Augustan Textile Colours Limited v. Director of Industries and Another

Citation

Date

Brief

REED 2022 SC 04003

Court

Supreme Court

Subject 

Sick Industry – SICA Proceedings – Revival of industry - Issue to be considered here was whether the benefit of tax exemption in respect of works contract granted in the process of revival of the industry - under the relevant provisions of the SICA - based on the Kerala Government communication dated 20.3.2004 can be withdrawn, by the subsequent government order dated 21.11.2006

April 7, 2022

Bench

N.A.

Applicable Law

Section 9, Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957
Article 14, Constitution of India
Sections 5, 10, 10(1), 10(1)(ii), 10(3), Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963
Sections 15, 17, 17(1), 17(2), 17(3), 18, 19, 19(1), 19(2), 19(3), 19(4), 20, Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985

The Division Bench of Kerala High Court concluded that the Appellant does not form a separate class of its own. Hence, the 2004 government order was held to be ultra vires the Section 10(1) of the KGST Act. The Appellant had failed to bring to the Supreme Court’s attention, any intelligible differentia, based on which
it can be said that they constitute a unique, separate class of its own. In absence of such differentiating factor, the benefit of tax exemptions being granted to the Appellant, to the exclusion of all other sick industries involved in similar activities, did not appear to be reasonable and should be seen as arbitrary. The 2004 government order was not only ultra vires Section 10(1) of KGST Act, but also falls short
by principle of reasonableness, fairness, and non-arbitrariness. The 2006 government order withdrawing the tax exemption was in fact issued to remedy this very mischief. Hence, the Appellant cannot invoke the principle of legitimate expectation against the 2006 government order.
In the case of Pawan Alloys & Casting Pvt. Ltd., Meerut v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Others, (1997) 7 SCC 251, where it was propounded that if the state, in exercise of its sovereign powers, grants any tax exemptions for a specified period, the principle of promissory estoppel does not bar the grantor from prematurely withdrawing such exemptions, if such measure is necessitated for protecting public interest. In other words, public interest would outweigh the interest of the individual grantee.
The Appellant here had already availed the exemption benefits for a substantial period and was the only one of its categories which enjoyed such advantage in the State of Kerala and also regard being had for the fact that now the Appellant was out of the red and more importantly in a situation where enforcing the promise against the State is likely to affect public interest.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Supreme Court, with the additional reasoning, was persuaded to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.